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I. INTRODUCTION
Although environmental laws have been on the books since the last
century,1 there has not been great concern for the environment until
recently. People may have recognized or heard of the pollution that
businesses were generating, but until dirty needles started washing up on
beaches, and millions of gallons of oil were spilled into the oceans, people
did not start asking for answers and demanding that someone be held
accountable. This Comment will first recount the evolution of
environmental laws from civil enforcement to criminal enforcement.
Second, the "responsible corporate officer" doctrine will be explained and
analyzed as a tool of criminal enforcement. Two indicators of the success
of this method, convictions and jail time, will put into perspective the
development and use of criminal sanctions. Third, the guidelines used by
the Department of Justice and the Environmental Protection Agency to
decide whether to criminally prosecute a violator or to pursue civil actions
instead will be addressed. Fourth, environmental auditing will be examined
as a viable method of keeping a company in compliance with the
complicated environmental laws. Environmental auditing can serve not
only to avoid criminal prosecution of the corporate officers, but also to
keep the company on the favorable side of the government if inadvertent
violations do occur. Finally, this Comment will discuss the next step
necessary for getting more businesses on track with auditing. It will
emphasize the crucial need for the government to adhere to its guidelines
for prosecution and to provide concrete rather than superficial guarantees
that self-initiated environmental auditing by a company will free it from
criminal prosecution.
I The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1988).
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II. THE MOVE FROM CIVIL TO CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
Although environmental laws existed well before 1970,2 a truly
organized federal approach did not appear until the creation of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).3 Around the same time
that Congress decided to establish an organization dedicated to the
environment, Congress also decided to enact some major legislation aimed
at preserving the environment. It accomplished this by amending the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act and other laws.4 After Congress
passed and amended these laws, the EPA had to devise a way to administer
them.5 Specifically, the "EPA had to construct an administrative structure
from scratch and establish 'technology-forcing' standards based on complex
scientific judgments." 6 Not only were the statutes novel, both to the
government and to the industries which would be affected by them, but the
science and technology that would be part and parcel to them would also be
new developments. 7
The novelty of the program, the statutes, and the scientific technology
involved all created complex problems which required civil and
2 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155
(1948) (later amended several times and now known as the Clean Water Act); The
Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (also later amended several
times).
3 Under the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, the EPA was created. The plan
consolidated duties from other divisions and transferred them into one agency, the
EPA. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (1970), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.
app. at 1132 (1982), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970). See F. Henry Habicht H1, The
Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the
Civil Side, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,478 n.2 (1987).
4 In 1972, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to become
the Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (later amended in 1977
and 1987), in order to get tougher on the pollutants and chemicals dumped into rivers
and other bodies of water. Also, the Clean Air Act was amended in 1970 to include
criminal penalties for violations. Pub. L. No. 91-604, §§ 4(a), 113(c), 84 Stat. 1676,
1686 (1970) (later amended in 1977 and 1990). See Dick Thornburgh, Criminal
Enforcement of Environmental Laws-A National Priority, 59 GEo. WAsH. L. REv.
775, 776 n.3 (1991).
5 See Habicht, supra note 3, at 10,478.
6 Id. (footnote omitted).
7 Id. The new laws demanded development by industry of revolutionary new ways
of making products or dealing with the side effects and wastes generated during
production. Id.
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administrative enforcement in order to be fair to the businesses affected. 8
Until a better understanding of the laws was grasped and the technology
needed to comply was developed (or, in some instances, the processes
creating the problem were changed), focus on criminal prosecutions for
violations would not only have failed to meet the purposes of criminal
sanctions, 9 but such focus would have been inherently unfair as well.' 0 In
addition, the courts were also new players in the field of environmental
regulation. They needed to become more familiar with the program, the
laws, and the overall changes necessary in business operations before they
could become heavily involved in criminal sanctioning.11
For the above reasons, the major environmental laws created and
developed in the 1970s lacked stiff, if any, criminal enforcement
provisions. 12 Therefore, the EPA resorted to civil and administrative
enforcement as its primary method of recovering damages and forcing
compliance. 13 Throughout the first decade of major environmental
regulation, 1970 to 1980, the government prosecuted only 25 criminal
environmental cases; in contrast, there were 358 civil actions and 77
consent decrees just in the three-year period of 1977-1980.14 Because both
the industries and the EPA had been given the time necessary to adjust to
these regulations, businesses should have approached full compliance by
1980.
However, businesses were still not complying because "[t]he cost of
violating environmental laws seemed to be a small enough price to pay
compared to the cost of compliance." 15 Without a strong deterrent,
8 Id.
9 The purposes of criminal law are prevention, restraint, rehabilitation,
deterrence, education, and retribution. WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. ScoTT, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5 (2d ed. 1986). The most important of these, for this Comment's
purpose, is deterrence. If businesses have not yet been able to adjust to the new laws
or have had difficulties understanding them, although they have put forth a good faith
effort to understand them, then no deterrence will be possible because they are doing
everything within their powers presently to comply.
10 See Habicht, supra note 3, at 10,478.
11 Id.12 Thornburgh, supra note 4, at 775.
13 See Frederick W. Addison III & Elizabeth E. Mack, Creating an
Environmental Ethic in Corporate America: The Big Stick of Jail Time, 44 Sw. LJ.
1427, 1430 (1991); James P. Calve, Environmental Crimes: Upping the Ante for
Noncompliance with Environmental Laws, 133 MIL. L. REv. 279, 285 (1991).
14 Habicht, supra note 3, at 10,479.
15 Thornburgh, supra note 4, at 775. Businesses have even commented that it is
cheaper to not comply and pay fines accordingly rather than expend money on the
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companies simply endured the civil fines for violations as a cost of doing
business, without remorse or concern for the havoc they were wreaking on
the environment and, indirectly, on the public. 16 Corporate officers or
other corporate decisionmakers who were responsible for instituting the
policies and procedures of these businesses were calculating the cost of
compliance versus the fine likely to be imposed, instead of developing
methods of compliance and avoiding criminal behavior regardless of CoSt. 17
By the early 1980s, the time had come to start treating the "most egregious
conduct" with something more than a simple "slap on the wrist" and a
nominal fine. 18
Tough environmental enforcement was no longer on the back burner.
Public opinion had become increasingly strong, demanding that better and
more effective action be taken against violators of environmental
regulations. 19 Sixty thousand people were surveyed in 1984 to rank crimes
in order of severity and the result ranked environmental crime in seventh
place-even above heroin smuggling!20 Criminal enforcement had to
supplant, or be used in addition to, civil action to respond to this public
outcry and force businesses into compliance.21
Criminal sanctions for environmental violations were a response to the
apathetic compliance attitudes of businesses. 22 "The ultimate goal of
criminal sanctions is deterring intentional violations of environmental
laws."2 3 Criminal sanctions, predominantly jail terms, are significantly
more effective deterrents than civil penalties for two major reasons: (1)
civil fines can be passed on to the consumer by simply raising the cost of
the company's product or service, while jail time cannot,24 and (2) criminal
penalties "drive home the fact that noncompliance is often a crime rather
than a business decision," and the stigma and adverse publicity that
costly technology necessary to comply. See Michael K. Glenn, The Crime of
"Pollution": The Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, 11 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 835, 836-37 (1973).
16 Calve, supra note 13, at 284.
17 Id.
18 Addison & Mack, supra note 13, at 1427.
19 Id. at 1429.
20 Id.; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN,
Jan. 1984, cited in Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 13 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 379, 380 n.1 (1986).
21 Starr, supra note 20, at 381-82.
22 Calve, supra note 13, at 284-85.
23 Id. at 284 (footnote omitted).
241d.
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accompany criminal convictions provide incentives to comply.25
Several different steps have been taken to develop and enhance criminal
enforcement of environmental crimes. The most significant step taken has
been criminalizing almost every existing environmental law and providing
much stricter sanctions for environmental violators. 26 Violators of these
laws can face felony convictions, not lesser misdemeanors, for their
actions. 27 The Department of Justice (DOJ), which is the governmental
branch responsible for prosecuting environmental crimes, created an
Environmental Crimes Unit to better equip itself to deal with the growth of
criminal prosecutions of environmental crimes. 28 At approximately the
same time, the EPA created its Criminal Investigations Program. 29 The
EPA has since recruited and trained an "elite cadre" of criminal
investigators who have the authority to execute search and arrest
warrants. 30 In addition to these improvements, the federal government has
promoted inter-agency cooperation to beef up investigation in the
environmental area.31 The Federal Bureau of Investigations has responded
to the EPA's request for help in investigations by focusing on
environmental crimes as a "special priority." 32 The combination of all of
these factors has created an overall greater effort and commitment to
catching and punishing violators: "Criminal enforcement of environmental
25 Id. (footnote omitted). Not only do chief executives and other high-ranking
officers want to avoid jail, but if noncompliance is looked at as a business decision,
negative publicity will significantly hurt business and that cost will outweigh the cost
of compliance. Although it is the company and generally not the CEO who receives
the negative publicity, to be successful, the CEO must make decisions that generate
profits and bestow economic benefits on the company. Negative publicity is, thus,
something the CEO will want to avoid.
26 Addison & Mack, supra note 13, at 1430.
27 Id. at 1429.
28 Mary Ellen Kris & Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal Environmental
Enforcement Program: Why You May Be Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard
Against Prosecution Through an Environmental Audit, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 227,
229 (1991).
29 Helen J. Brunner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective View,
22 ENVTL. L. 1315, 1323 (1992).
30 Habicht, supra note 3, at 10,479. They have these powers because the DOJ
deputized them, thereby giving them the powers of a United States Marshal, and the
agents are known as "Special Deputy U.S. Marshals." Brunner, supra note 29, at
1324.
31 Habicht, supra note 3, at 10,479.
3 2 Id.
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laws is not merely a goal, it is a priority."33
With enforcement as the priority, the DOJ has recently decided that its
target is the corporate executive officer. 34 "What happens to the deterrence
we talk about? ... Who is the corporation? ... I [District Court Judge
Tanner] think the public is entitled to know who's responsible .... I want
the top officer here."35 Criminal prosecutions of "responsible corporate
officers" have steadily increased since the criminal penalties were added to
the existing laws, and prosecutions of individuals now outnumber
prosecutions of corporations by a three to one margin. 36 "When it
investigates an environmental crime, [the] DOJ tries to identify, prosecute,
and convict the highest ranking person responsible for the violation. " 37
Because these high-ranking officials are generally responsible for the policy
and procedure that the company implements regarding its environmental
operations, it is extremely important that these officials have the necessary
incentive to make decisions that emphasize compliance and immediate
notification should an accident or violation occur.
III. THE KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION-THE RESPONSIBLE
CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
Successful enforcement of environmental laws will, of course, depend
upon the success of convicting those who commit such violations. The two
major tools that have been developed and expanded to increase the success
of criminal environmental prosecutions are: (1) the "responsible corporate
officer" doctrine, and (2) a loose general intent requirement for a
"knowing" violation.38
33 Thornburgh, supra note 4, at 776 (emphasis added).
34 See Calve, supra note 13, at 289.
35 Joseph G. Block & Nancy A. Voisin, The Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine-Can You Go to Jail for What You Don't Know?, 22 ENVTL. L. 1347, 1347
(1992) (quoting U.S. District Court Judge lack E. Tanner, who would not allow
Pennwalt Corporation to plead guilty to illegal dumping of carcinogens into a water
source channeled into the Puget Sound until its CEO appeared before the court to
acknowledge the seriousness of the offense) (footnote omitted).
36 Janet L. Woodka, Sentencing the CEO: Personal Liability of Corporate
Executives for Environmental Crimes, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 635, 635-36 (1992).
37 Calve, supra note 13, at 289.
3 8 Most of the environmental crime statutes have a "knowing" requirement that
must be proven before a jury can find the defendant guilty. For example, in order to
impose criminal liability under the Clean Air Act, the prosecution must prove
defendant "knowingly violat[ed] any requirement or prohibition of an applicable
implementation plan.... ." 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Similarly, the
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A. The Basis of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine
The basis of the responsible corporate officer doctrine comes from the
public welfare area of criminal law, where it is used to "impute knowledge
of corporate activity to top corporate officers." 39 Guilt for a conviction of
a criminal violation usually requires some amount of blameworthiness.40
The blameworthiness of an act or omission can be assessed on several
different levels-the criminal conduct can be intentional, knowing,
reckless, or even negligent-but generally, at least one of these is
required. 41 However, courts have treated violations of public health and
welfare regulations differently. 42 Because of the danger to the public posed
by violations of these laws, the courts have held defendants strictly liable
for their actions, or have found guilt on a level that appears to be below
one of standard criminal negligence. 43 This area of law has spawned the
responsible corporate officer doctrine, and the two leading cases in this
area are United States v. Dotterweich44 and United States v. Park.45
In Dotterweich, Dotterweich, the president and general manager of the
Buffalo Pharmacal Company, Inc., was charged, along with the company,
with violating the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.46 Although the
company was not convicted, Dotterweich was found guilty of "'[tihe
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) provides penalties for "any person
who knowingly transports ... any hazardous waste.., to a facility which does not
have a permit," 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1988) and "knowingly treats, stores or
disposes of any hazardous waste... without a permit," 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A)
(1988). The Clean Water Act of 1977 (33 U.S.C. § 1319) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 9603, 9604) are two other environmental statutes, among the many, that contain
"knowing" elements in their violation requirements.
3 9 Block & Voisin, supra note 35, at 1347.
40 See LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 9, at § 1.2(a).
41 See id. at § 3.4.
42 Stephen Herm, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws on Federal
Facilities, 59 GEo. WASH. L. RaV. 938, 957-58 (1991).
43 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). This case may represent a
standard below criminal negligence because the defendant had to prove that it was
"objectively impossible" to do any more than he actually did to prevent the violation;
yet it appears that this defense would mean that the crime is not a strict liability crime.
44 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
45 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
46 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of
which Dotterweich was charged with violating was, at that time, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-
392 (1938).
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introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of
any... drug... that is adulterated or misbranded.'" 47 The statute was a
public welfare regulation purposely requiring no mens rea for the
protection of the public, who did not have the opportunity to protect
itself.48 The Court affirmed Dotterweich's conviction because of his
"responsible share" in an illegal transaction against which the public
cannot guard itself.49 The Court stated:
The offense is committed... by all who do have such a responsible share
in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute
outlaws.... Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus
penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally
wanting. Balancing relative hardships, Congress has preferred to place it
upon those who have at least the opportunity of informing themselves of
the existence of conditions imposed for the protection of consumers before
sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to throw the hazard on the
innocent public who are wholly helpless. 50
The Court, thus, established its basis for the responsible corporate officer
doctrine, which would be further developed and explained in United States
v. Park.51
In Park, Park, the president and chief executive officer (CEO) of Acme
Markets, Inc., was charged, along with the corporation, with violating the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act when he allowed food to be
exposed to contamination by rodents that infested the warehouse where the
food awaited sale.52 Unlike Dotterweich, Park had received notification
from the Food and Drug Administration that the unsanitary conditions were
in violation of the law. 53 Park tried to defend himself on the ground that he
addressed the problem with the people in charge of sanitation, to whom he
had delegated authority, and although he had the responsibility of general
oversight of company operations, there was nothing more he could do.5 4
The Court stated that a "responsible relationship" implied some
blameworthiness and the government need only prove that "the defendant
had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and
47
,Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 278 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1938)).
48 Id. at 280-81.
49 Id. at 284-85.
5 0 Id. (emphasis added).
51 421 U.S. 658 (1975).52 Id. at 660.
53 Id. at 661-63.
54 Id. at 663-64.
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authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the
violation complained of, and that he failed to do so." 55 However, the Court
emphasized that such an officer could not be convicted based solely on his
position in the company; a responsible relation and authority to deal with
the situation was necessary to convict.5 6 Thus, the Court clarified the
responsible corporate officer doctrine that had been created in Dotterweich
and established the highest standard of care for corporate officials, who
will have to assume the duty of prevention or correction of violations if
this power is inherent to their position in the corporation. 57
B. The Transition-Moving the Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine into the Environmental Arena
Because the responsible corporate officer doctrine applies to health and
welfare statutes, it is essential that environmental regulations be viewed as
such if the doctrine is to be applied to environmental laws. The fact that
the statutes aim at protecting the environment and remedying any problems
which occur is evidence of an intent to protect the public5s The
congressional history of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) explicitly acknowledges that protection of the public's health and
welfare is its purpose.5 9 Wyckoff Co. v. EPA60 and United States v. Hayes
International Corp.61 are just two cases among many that evidence the
courts' firmly established acceptance of environmental laws as public
health and welfare regulations. 62 Because environmental laws have become
firmly rooted in the health and welfare context, an analysis of the
developments and modifications to the responsible corporate officer
doctrine as applied to the environmental statutes must be conducted.
55 Id. at 673-74.
56 Id. at 674.
57 Id. at 676. It should be noted that Park does not create a strict liability standard
for it leaves the defendant with the defense of objective impossibility. See supra note
43. 58 Block & Voisin, supra note 35, at 1350.
59 Id.
60 796 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that "[tihe Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act..., 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., was enacted to protect the national
health and environment." Id. at 1198).
61 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that "section 6928(d)(1) [part of
RCRA] is undeniably a public welfare statute, involving a heavily regulated area with
great ramifications for the public health and safety." Id. at 1503).62 Block & Voisin, supra note 35, at n.9.
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Unlike the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, upon which Park and
Dotterweich are based, environmental laws are not strict liability crimes
because they incorporate some type of mens rea, usually a "knowing"
standard, into the crime. 63 Because the statutes contain knowledge
requirements, strict application of the responsible corporate officer doctrine
as described in Dotterweich and Park is not possible. 64 Instead, the
doctrine has been modified to act as evidence of knowledge by inference
only, and not as a method of holding the officer liable by reason of the
power inherent in his position. 65 Before reviewing this modification, a look
at the intent requirements of the environmental statutes is necessary.
Unlike most statutes, which require proof of specific intent for a
conviction, 66 environmental laws have been read to require only general
intent.67 The courts' application of a general intent standard to
environmental statutes has resulted in requiring only proof of the
defendant's knowledge of his actions, rather than proof of knowledge of
the violation, for a conviction. 68 The effect of this general intent standard
is, that to prove criminal knowledge, the government need only prove the
defendant's actions were voluntary, rather than accidental or mistaken. 69
Nonetheless, knowledge of the actions is necessary for conviction.
Therefore, the responsible corporate officer doctrine has been adopted and
modified by the courts and prosecutors to establish this last vital link for a
conviction.
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,70 the company and an
employee (a foreman of the facility) were charged with violating RCRA by
disposing of hazardous waste unlawfully.71 The Third Circuit held that
employees, as well as owners and operators of the plant, could be charged
if they "knew or should have known" that the company had not complied
with the permit requirement. 72 In order to establish this knowledge, the
court stated that the jury would be permitted to infer knowledge "as to
63 See supra note 38.
64 See Block & Voisin, supra note 35, at 1354-58.
65 Id.
66 LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 9, at § 3.5(e).
67 Block & Voisin, supra note 35, at 1357.
68 See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984)
("knowing" about conduct in certain regulatory statutes means knowledge of actions
taken, not knowledge of the statute itself (citing United States v. International Minerals
& Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971))).69 Block & Voisin, supra note 35, at 1357-58.
70 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
71 Id. at 663-64.
72 Id. at 664-65.
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those individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with the
corporate defendant." 73 Thus, the responsible corporate officer doctrine
can be used as a tool to allow the jury to infer that the employee has the
knowledge necessary for a conviction, and it significantly lightens the
burden of the prosecution in environmental cases.
In United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 74 the First
Circuit established a similar use of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine, but made it extremely clear that the doctrine was not a substitute
for knowledge. The appellate court reversed the district court when it
found that the district court's jury instructions allowed, in effect, the jury
to find knowledge based solely on proof that the defendant was a
responsible corporate officer. 75 According to the appellate court, this
doctrine cannot replace proof of knowledge. However, the appellate court
explained that the district court could have instructed the jury to use
circumstantial evidence to find knowledge and that the defendant's position
as a responsible corporate officer could be a valid part of such
circumstantial evidence. 76 "IT]he [district] court could, had it wished, have
elaborated on the extent to which [defendant's] responsibilities and duties
might lead to a reasonable inference that he knew of
the... transaction." 77 The court, thus, established a wise adaptation of
the responsible corporate officer doctrine: it is a possible piece in proving
knowledge, but other pieces of evidence should be used in conjunction with
it in order to effectively prove defendant's knowledge.
One of the most expansive uses of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine can be found in the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Brittain.78 The defendant appealed his conviction under the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972 (Clean Water Act) for discharging pollutants
into the water.79 The evidence revealed that the defendant, the operational
manager of the plant discharging the pollutants, had substantial knowledge
of violations and willfully allowed the violations to continue.80 Because his
defense was based on the argument that he was not a "person" under the
statute, 81 a reading the court ultimately rejected, the court's interpretation
73 Id. at 670.
74 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
75 Id. at 52.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991).
79 Id. at 1414.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 1418-19.
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of "responsible corporate officer" is only dicta. However, it is important to
note the expansive reading the court gave it:
We interpret the addition of "responsible corporate officers" as an
expansion of liability under the Act rather than... an implicit
limitation.... Under this interpretation, a "responsible corporate
officer," to be held criminally liable, would not have to "willfully or
negligently" cause a permit violation. Instead, the willfulness or
negligence of the actor would be imputed to him by virtue of his position
of responsibility.8 2
Although only dicta, this language is a good indication of the court's
willingness to allow knowledge of criminal negligence to be established
very circumstantially, and without any significant amount of substantial
proof.
Although not all of the circuits have allowed such expansive use of the
responsible corporate officer doctrine, most of the courts have very loose
requirements for proving general intent, thus leaving the prosecution with a
very light burden.83 The responsible corporate officer doctrine combines
with the loose general intent requirement to serve as a formidable weapon
in a criminal prosecution. 84 As long as evidence of knowledge is used in
conjunction with evidence of defendant's status as a responsible corporate
officer, an effective deterrent to criminal environmental violations as a
"cost of doing business" has been created. High ranking officials now have
incentive to become aware of the activities in their facility and implement
programs that will keep them out of the courtroom. However, the strength
of the deterrent depends both on the success of convictions and the
penalties accompanying such convictions.
82 Id. at 1419.
83 See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (declining to follow
other circuits and finding that knowledge of the permit status for disposal of waste was
inherent and that the director need only know that his disposal was "harmful" to the
environment, not "hazardous" as defined in the statute); United States v. Hayes Int'l
Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that knowledge of the permit status of
the facility is necessary for a conviction, but that knowledge does not require
certainty; and jurors can draw inferences from all of the circumstances).
84 The increased success in obtaining pleas and convictions for environmental
violations and the increased harshness in the corresponding sentences illustrate how
these two components have become a formidable weapon. See infra notes 87-89 and
101-04 and accompanying text on statistics of convictions and sentencing.
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C. Success of Prosecuting and Sentencing for Environmental Crimes
1. Criminal Prosecution of Environmental Crimes
As noted before, there were only twenty-five criminal prosecutions for
environmental violations throughout the entire 1970s.85 The climate has
changed, however, and since the Environmental Crimes Unit was created,
indictments and prosecutions have steadily increased.86 In 1983, there was
only a total of forty defendants who were indicted for environmental
violations, and forty pleas and convictions were obtained.8 7 Throughout the
rest of the 1980s, however, there was a steady climb, and in 1989, 101
defendants were indicted and, even more impressive, 107 guilty pleas and
convictions were acquired.88 In fact, the government became so proficient
at prosecuting environmental crimes that in 1990, the Assistant Attorney
General in the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the DOJ
said that the conviction rate for environmental crimes was above ninety-five
percent.89 The government, now armed with its specialized criminal
investigations and prosecution department for environmental crimes, is
most often successful in obtaining either a guilty plea or a conviction from
the "responsible" people it targets.
2. The Punch that Goes with Conviction-Sentencing the
Environmental Criminal
If a convicted criminal was never penalized for his guilt, a conviction
would have little effect. Originally, when people were convicted for
environmental crimes, the penalties were minimal. 90 However, as attitudes
towards environmental violations and the culprits have changed, so have
the penalties. 91
From the beginning and continuing throughout the early to mid-1980s,
federal judges had immense discretion in sentencing those convicted of
85 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
86 See Edward W. Brady, A Wrong Turn on the Road to Effective Enforcement; A
Critical Analysis of the Environmental Cinmes Act of 1990, 1 DIcK. I. ENvTL. L. &
POL'Y 23, 24 (1991).
87 Robert W. Adler & Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes,
59 GO. WASH. L. Rnv. 781, app. B (1991).
88 Id.
89 Addison & Mack, supra note 13, at 1438-39 and n.102.
90 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 20 and accompanying text ranking environmental crimes.
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environmental crimes. 92 Once a judge had a defendant convicted of a
federal crime before him, "[he] could sentence [the] defendant to hours or
years of imprisonment, place the defendant on probation, or simply impose
a fine," knowing that his decision would only be overturned for manifest
abuse.93 The large amount of discretion in the system allowed for huge
disparities in sentencing two defendants for the same crime. Thus, a
defendant in Maine could receive a light sentence that was suspended and
substituted with probation, while another in California could serve all his
time in prison.94 As a result of this system, where judges used their
discretionary power to avoid imposing harsh sentences for first-time
offenders in this relatively new area, defendants convicted in the early to
mid-1980s did not receive terribly harsh sentences and spent little, if any,
time in jail. 95
In 1984, the Comprehensive Crime Control Act was passed,
establishing the United States Sentencing Commission. 96 This independent
commission of the judicial branch set out to establish, inter alia, "certainty
and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing" and to avoid
"unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar
records .... "97 Shortly thereafter, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
were promulgated and became effective in 1987. 98 One of its basic goals
was to set up a system that had the requisite power for effectively
combatting crime by employing uniformity and proportionality in moving
towards its goal. 99 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have forced judges
to deal with environmental criminals much more seriously; sentencing has
become much less a matter of discretion and has turned into, generally,
"mathematical computations." 100 Congress showed that it wanted
defendants convicted of violating environmental laws treated as what they
are-criminals.
In 1983, a total of eleven years in sentences were imposed on
92 Jane Barrett, Sentencing Environmental Crimes Under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines-A Sentencing Lottery, 22 ENVTL. L. 1421, 1422 (1992).
93 Id.
94 See Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. Kelly, Jr., Environmental Crimes and the
Sentencing Guidelines: The Tie Has Cowe... and It Is Hard Time, 20 ENVWL. L.
REP. 10,096, 10,097 (1990).
95 Adler & Lord, supra note 87, at app. E.
96 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988).
97 28 U.S.C. § 991(a), (b)(1)(B) (1988).
98 UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL (1994).
99 Id. at 2.
100 Starr & Kelly, supra note 94, at 10,096.
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environmental criminals, but only five years were actually served. 101 In
contrast, the year 1989 generated fifty-one years and twenty-five months in
sentences for those people who broke the law after the enactment of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'12 Despite the fact that only thirty-six years
and fourteen months were actually served, 10 3 the increase was significant,
especially because the Federal Sentencing Guidelines abolished parole. 104
The stiffest penalties allowed by the statutes and the guidelines, however,
are usually still not imposed.' 05 This fact should not put responsible
corporate officers at ease because the government and courts are still very
willing to make environmental criminals pay much more than before.
The intended effect of the responsible corporate officer doctrine is to
force CEOs and high-ranking officials to develop new, responsible
attitudes about business and the environment that will result in greater
compliance. Civil and administrative penalties have proven to be
insufficient deterrents in many cases where managers willingly and
knowingly violate the law as a cost of doing business. 1'6 The responsible
corporate officer doctrine is a viable and necessary weapon for improved
deterrence. CEOs are in the best position, and now have the most incentive
with the threat of jail time, to make the needed changes for company
compliance. Applied in the correct manner, the responsible corporate
officer doctrine is a fair and useful tool for keeping the environment
cleaner and safer for the public.
IV. AN INTELLIGENT RESPONSE-USING AuDrrS TO COMPLY AND TO
AvoiD CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
It is EPA policy to encourage the use of environmental auditing by
regulated entities to help achieve and maintain compliance with
environmental laws and regulations, as well as to help identify and correct
unregulated environmental hazards. 107
The best way for a company and, particularly, its high-ranking
officers, to respond to the government's new threat of criminal prosecution
101 Calve, supra note 13, at 288 n.48.
102Id.
103 Id.
104 Starr & Kelly, supra note 94, at 10,097.
105 Adler & Lord, supra note 87, at 800-01.
106 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
107 Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 25,004 (1986)
[hereinafter Policy Statement].
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is to implement an audit program. Both the EPA and the DOJ look
favorably upon industries that use such programs. The government should
give credit to the CEOs and other officers for these programs because,
generally, they are the people responsible for creating and implementing
them. "Regulated entities are responsible for taking all necessary steps to
ensure compliance with environmental requirements, whether or not they
adopt audit programs .... [U]ltimate responsibility for the environmental
performance of the facility lies with top management .... "108 If the top
officers are held responsible for violations, then, correspondingly, they
should also be given credit for their attempts at compliance, including audit
programs. The CEO should always put a good faith effort into the program
and be ready to make any corrections or take any remedial measures
necessary to fix or prevent problems once the plan has been enacted.
Although there are downsides to these comprehensive programs that will
be discussed below, the benefits outweigh the costs and everyone should
benefit overall when an effective and comprehensive compliance program
has been put into effect.
A. The Department of Justice's Guidelines on Who to Target for a
Criminal Prosecution
It is the policy of the Department of Justice to encourage self-auditing,
self-policing and voluntary disclosure of environmental violations by the
regulated community by indicating that these activities are viewed as
mitigating factors in the Department's exercise of criminal environmental
enforcement discretion. 109
The EPA and the DOJ now have a high-powered arsenal of special
agents to investigate violations and favorable standards for proving
knowledge to prosecute environmental violators. However, this does not
mean that they will automatically seek a criminal indictment in every
situation. Civil and administrative remedies still remain viable options and
are most often used, especially when the DOJ believes the defendant's
"good" behavior merits an exemption from criminal prosecution.110 The
108 Id. at 25,006-07.
109 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions
for Environmental Violations in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or
Disclosure Efforts by the Violator, July 1, 1991, reprinted in James R. Moore,
Environmental Criminal Statutes: An Effective Deterrent?, 1992 CIuM. ENFORCEMENT
ENVTL. L. 137, 162 [hereinafter Factors in Decisions].
110 In this context, "good" means that either the defendant had put a good faith
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DOJ has promulgated guidelines that it follows when an environmental
violation has occurred and uses the guidelines when deciding what type of
sanctions should be sought. 111
To determine when to prosecute, the DOJ looks at five main factors:
voluntary disclosure, cooperation, presence of a compliance program,
condonation of unlawful activity, and the scope and nature of subsequent
compliance efforts.112 Regarding preventative measures of a compliance
program and the program itself, the DOJ has said:
The [prosecutor] should consider the existence and scope of any
regularized, intensive, and comprehensive environmental
compliance... or management audit. Particular consideration should be
given to whether the compliance or audit program includes sufficient
measures to identify and prevent future noncompliance, and whether the
program was adopted in good faith in a timely manner. 113
When investigating a company's compliance program, the DOJ is greatly
concerned with the defendant's institutional policies and procedures. 114
One such aspect the DOJ investigates is the adequate safeguards, if any,
beyond what the law calls for, and what measures were taken, not only to
detect and evaluate violations, but also to report and remedy them when
they occur. 115 Although the DOJ's framework does not legally bind the
DOJ to forego criminal prosecutions when the above have been
implemented in some form, n 6 there is a great chance that the company and
the responsible officer will be exposed only to administrative or civil
penalties, not criminal ones.
effort into complying with the laws through an auditing program or some other
program or the defendant willingly cooperated with the DO] once the violation had
occurred. See Factors in Decisions, supra note 109, at 165-66.
111 Id.
112 led S. Rakoff & Alex Lipman, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Laws: Basic Provisions and Current Controversies, 797 P.L.I./Corp.
611, 626 (1992).
113 Factors in Decisions, supra note 109, at 165.
114 Id.
115 See id.
116 The DOJ's memorandum (Factors in Decisions) is only a guideline and the
DO] is in no way bound legally to the provisions listed within it. See Terrell E. Hunt
& Timothy A. Wilkins, Environmental Audits and Enforcement Policy, 16 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 365, 400 (1992).
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B. The Audit Program
An environmental audit program is basically an extensive or rigorous
self-evaluating, self-policing program which a business implements to
assist it with maintaining compliance with tough and complex
environmental regulations. 117 According to the EPA, an environmental
audit is "a systematic, documented, periodic and objective review by
regulated entities of facility operations and practices related to meeting
environmental requirements."' 18 Audit programs tend to be broken into
two groups, "compliance audits" and "management audits," and the focus
of each is slightly different. 119 Compliance audits are primarily concerned
with investigation by an environmental expert of compliance with the
environmental laws and regulations; management audits focus on "review
of the managerial risk-control systems and procedures used by the
corporation or facility to detect and remedy possible violations and
potentially problematic environmental conditions."120
One type of program need not be used at the exclusion of the other.
The primary goal, which must always be kept in mind, is compliance, and
a combination of the two types of audits might form the best program to
meet that goal. The focus of the CEO must first be on determining the
company's needs for achieving compliance so that he can then develop an
efficient, 'effective program that specifically addresses these needs.
1. The Current State of Affairs
Regulated business facilities are not required by law to develop or
maintain audit programs.' 2' This lack of mandatory regulation is a benefit
to the EPA, but primarily it benefits the regulated facility and its chief
officer. The EPA benefits because a mandatory program would require the
agency to commit much of its scarce resources to developing and enforcing
these programs. 122 Instead of spending its resources on this program, the
EPA can channel its funds into prosecuting violators and repairing or
1 17 Daniel Riesel, Criminal Enforcement and the Regulation of the Environment,
1993 ENVTL. LrrIG. 869, 909-10.
118 Policy Statement, supra note 107, at 25,006 (footnote omitted).
119 Hunt & Willdns, supra note 116, at 366.
120 Id. (footnote omitted).
121 Policy Statement, supra note 107, at 25,006.
122 George Van Cleve, The Changing Intersection of Environmental Auditing,
Environmental Law and Enforcement Policy, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1215, 1221-22
(1991).
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remedying damages caused by the violations. The EPA and the public also
benefit from voluntary rather than mandatory programs because the quality
of a compliance program depends on the management's genuine
commitment to it and its objectives. 123 Therefore, a voluntary program
with higher commitment produces a better overall program. If enough
incentives exist such that most industries will voluntarily develop these
compliance programs, the EPA's efforts are better spent elsewhere than
enforcement and regulation of them.
The company and CEO receive the primary benefit of nonregulated,
nonmandated programs through the freedom to develop a custom-built
program that best addresses the needs and specifications of that individual
facility. The "EPA agrees that presenting highly specific and prescriptive
auditing elements could be counter-productive by not taking into account
numerous factors which vary extensively from one organization to
another .... "124 Every regulated facility will not be in danger of violating
every environmental law; the limited focus and production of an industry
might pose a threat of violations to only one environmental law. For
example, a company's by-product and current disposal system might be in
danger of violating the Clean Water Act while it will not be in danger of
violating RCRA, the Clean Air Act, or the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.
The CEO is in the best position to evaluate the specific areas in need of
monitoring and compliance and can develop a program tailored to meet
these specific needs. If the EPA were to develop general standards for a
mandatory compliance program, a CEO might be forced to implement
costly monitoring systems to meet the EPA's requirements even though the
CEO's facility poses no environmental threat in that area. Also, the top
management understands the operations and procedures of its facility best,
so it can develop a program that runs most efficiently and effectively in
conjunction with these operating systems. With the freedom to choose and
develop his own type of program, the CEO has the opportunity to create
the most cost-efficient and compliance-effective program for his company,
which will ultimately result in substantial savings.
Although there is no standard or generic auditing program that a
business must use, the overall program should include certain features to
make it effective. Planning and a commitment of a significant amount of
resources are necessary parts of every program.125 Usually included in an
audit program are full examinations of records regarding emissions of
123 Policy Statement, supra note 107, at 25,007.
124 Id. at 25,005.
125 Kris & Vannelli, supra note 28, at 240.
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pollutants, permit status checks of the facility, practices of handling and
transporting hazardous materials, and storage of such materials. 126 Not
only should periodic written reports be generated, but also the responsible
corporate officer should become involved in the program by implementing
environmentally-conscious practices and procedures that must be
followed.1 27 Because subordinate managers often feel pressured to increase
company profits in order to be recognized or promoted, 128 the CEO should
not just implement "good-looking" environmental policies and procedures;
he must also make it absolutely clear that these practices are to be strictly
adhered to rather than just paying lip service to them. "Commanders and
supervisors also have a duty to train subordinates at all levels for the
environmental compliance mission." 129 Because the responsible corporate
officer doctrine requires great vigilance on the part of the CEO and may
hold him responsible for his subordinate's illegal behavior in some
circumstances, 130 instituting open lines of communication and regular
oversight of his subordinates should insulate the CEO from criminal
prosecution for the subordinate's illegal behavior if it occurs and if it is in
direct contravention of the company's policies. A true, good-faith effort in
instituting a high-quality, comprehensive compliance program should be
the goal of all responsible corporate officers as it is one of the best
defenses to a criminal prosecution.
Audit programs help protect the corporation from criminal prosecution
because they provide an effective means for identifying and immediately
correcting violations, before the government initiates an action against the
corporation. "Environmental auditing has developed for sound business
reasons, particularly as a means of helping regulated entities manage
pollution control affirmatively over time instead of reacting to crises." 131
With the proper program in place, a company can quickly identify the
problem and immediately address the situation with appropriate measures
before the problem turns into a disaster that would mandate the
involvement of the EPA and the DOJ. Because corporations are not
physical beings capable of making their own decisions, these programs
126 Id.
127 See Addison & Mack, supra note 13, at 1439-40.
128 See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV.
386, 397-99 (1981).
129 Calve, supra note 13, at 344.
130 See United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1418-19 (10th Cir. 1991); see
also Calve, supra note 13, at 343-44.
131 Policy Statement, supra note 107, at 25,006 (footnote omitted).
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should protect the high-ranking officials who have become main targets.
These high-ranking officials are the people who create and implement the
programs and, correspondingly, must get the respective credit for doing so.
As long as the DOJ adheres to its policy statement, 132 even if a business
does not remedy the problem before action is taken (assuming the behavior
was not willful and its conduct not egregious), that action by the DOJ will
only be administrative or civil.
One of the most important benefits of a comprehensive compliance
program is the one the public receives-a cleaner environment. Many
environmental laws contain self-reporting requirements, 133 and the EPA
needs accurate reports to be successful in protecting the environment.134 If
these programs are instituted, there will be less likelihood of misstatements
or misrepresentations reported by the company from lack of knowledge of
the facility's status, and also, a reduction in the chance of putting the
"integrity of the [EPA's] system [of monitoring and regulating] in
danger." 135 With a comprehensive compliance program in place, the
company is in a better position to respond when violations or accidents
occur. Further, the EPA, if immediately notified, can help remedy the
situation. Also, the difficulties in complying with complex environmental
regulations and the need for auditing produces a "best management"
effect.' 36 If best management is a result of such programs, businesses are
in better positions to prevent accidents rather than just responding
effectively to them. Prevention of problems can lead to huge savings in the
clean-up costs that always accompany remedying the problem. 137 Increased
success of the EPA combined with better management will then provide an
overall cleaner environment.
There are, however, downsides to auditing programs.138
132 See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
133 CERCLA requires notification of any hazardous releases (hazardous materials
being defined in the statute) into the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988). RCRA
requires various statements and information as well as records that must be reported
under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (1988).
134 Memorandum from Thomas Adams, Assistant Administrator, EPA Officer of
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, to Assistant Administrator, et al., EPA,
Environmental Criminal Conduct Coming to the Attention of Agency Officials and
Employees, at 1-2 (Sept. 21, 1987).
135 Id.
136 See Kris & Vannelli, supra note 28, at 228. The traditional goal of the EPA in
encouraging audits was to improve the management of environmental facilities,
thereby improving compliance. Van Cleve, supra note 122, at 1234.
137 See Kris & Vannelli, supra note 28, at 244.
138 See Riesel, supra note 117, at 910-11.
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Environmental audits may often reveal violations that could trigger
government action against a company if the government believes the
company was not acting in "good faith" or was deficient in some other
area. 139 The United States is allowed to use these audits in a criminal
prosecution, and when the DOJ does use them, they are an effective source
of evidence for proving a knowing violation.140 An audit is effective
because the government now has documented proof that the company and
its CEO were aware of the violation and, therefore, can prove the knowing
element. Moreover, unless the company has produced the audits using a
particular method to shield them from the government (such as having
them prepared by counsel so as to be protected by the attorney work
product doctrine), these damning audits can be subpoenaed and forced to
be turned over under discovery rules. 141 In addition to these problems,
audit programs can be an extremely expensive cost to the company. 142 A
company may feel cheated or at a significant economic disadvantage if its
competitor has not initiated these programs and is subsequently saving on
the outlay cost for them.143 Although there are disincentives to auditing, a
responsible corporate officer should nonetheless implement in good faith a
comprehensive program that includes provisions for responding to
problems once they occur in order to maintain favorable standing with the
DOJ.44
2. A Change Is Needed-The Government Must Adjust Current Laws
and Policies to Create Better Incentives for Companies to
Voluntarily Implement Auditing Programs
The government must always remember and emphasize that
environmental compliance, not successful prosecution of CEOs, is the
goal. 145 When the government's prosecutorial power under the responsible
corporate officer doctrine is examined in conjunction with the DOJ's and
139 See Van Cleve, supra note 122, at 1227.
140 See Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 116, at 367.
141 Id. at 376-88. For a good explanation of the possible methods of protecting
environmental audits from discovery, see id. at 376-92.
142 See Kris & Vannelli, supra note 28, at 240, 244-45.
143 This, of course, is true only if companies without programs manage to either:
(1) maintain compliance (which is unlikely bearing in mind the complexity of
environmental laws), or (2) escape the notice of the EPA.
144 James R. Moore, Environmental Criminal Statutes: An Effective Deterrent?,
1992 CRiM. ENFORCEMENT ENVTL. L. 137.
145 Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 116, at 374.
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the EPA's current guidelines regarding audit programs, a goal of
punishment seems to be created. Currently, the government has a very
light burden for proving a knowing violation, 146 which can be easily met
by forcing companies to turn over their audit reports that document the
areas of noncompliance. 47 Conversely, very little protection exists for the
CEO in the environmental realm. "If the form [or goal] of punishment
discourages compliance-related efforts, the enforcement policy should be
re-examined." 148 The government needs to re-evaluate and correct its
current policies so the emphasis is shifted back to compliance and away
from punishment.
The government should make several changes to create more auditing
incentives and to offset the disincentives because: (1) the success of the
EPA depends on accurate self-reports from businesses, 149 and (2) the
public benefits overall from auditing programs.' 50 The first change that
should be made is instituting a legally binding policy that will prevent the
government from criminally prosecuting companies with compliance
programs if a good faith effort has been a proven element of the program.
A "guarantee" is not enough. 151
A critical, comprehensive, self-initiated program will involve
documenting every aspect of a company's environmental compliance status,
including violations and potential risks. Without this information, a
company will not be in a position to address its weaknesses and remedy
current violations; however, a CEO is very reluctant to document this
information because it can currently be used against him in a criminal
prosecution. 152 Once the government allows the CEO to protect such
records when generated under a good faith audit program and in the
absence of egregious conduct, more high-ranking officials will authorize
these rigorous and much needed self-evaluations. Also, this binding
guarantee allows greater exchange of information within the company and
between managers because they do not have to worry about disclosure or
about expending extra and needless money to use a costly special method
of preparation (i.e., the attorney work product doctrine)153 to protect these
reports. The public benefits from a cleaner environment without a
146 See supra part IJI.B.
147 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
148 Hunt & Wilkins, supra note 116, at 374.
149 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 133-37.
151 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
153 See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
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substantial increase in the cost of the company's products. Of course, the
good faith element of the standard for precluding disclosure must be
defined as clearly as possible so businesses have an idea of the high
standards that must be met.
The second change that should be made is implementing an
"environmental excellence" program for the companies which meet the
high standards of a model compliance program.' 54 The program should
consist of two main parts. The first part should entail giving the company
public recognition as an "environmentally conscious" organization.' 55 As
noted before, the public has become much more concerned about the
environment and is demanding that it be treated as a top priority.1 56 If a
company receives a public designation for its environmental compliance
efforts, the business will most likely receive an economic benefit due to
increased popularity and enhanced public image. The EPA must create a
model program with very high standards that go beyond mere compliance
and demand complex or extensive maintenance and monitoring of
environmental facilities for participation in the program. 157
The environmental excellence program should also contain either a
grace period for remediation of violations or a presumption against
prosecution. If using a grace period, the government should establish a
specified time period which immediately follows a violation that allows a
company participating in the program to immediately remedy the problem
without threat of prosecution. A participating company should have an
environmental response and remediation program in operating order to be a
part of the environmental excellence program and to address these
problems as they occur. If the company does repair any and all damages
within the grace period, no criminal action should be initiated by the
government.
A strong presumption against enforcement may be used in lieu of the
grace period. "Where the regulated entity has [implemented an
environmental excellence program] and the problems disclosed have been
addressed in good faith in a timely and appropriate manner, there should be
154 See Moore, supra note 144, at 157.
155 See id. at 157-58.
156 See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
157 The EPA is currently looking into such an incentive program called the
"Environmental Leadership Program," 58 Fed. Reg. 4802 (1992), but the details and
components are quite sketchy. The agency has requested input from the public as it
develops the program. David T. Buente, Jr. et al., Developing and Implementing an
Environmental Corporate Compliance Program, 1993 CRIM. ENFORCEMENT ENVTL. L.
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a strong presumption against enforcement."158 The government is not
absolutely precluded from taking actions, both civil and criminal, against
the company, but the prosecuting authority should be required to
specifically state the reasons that warrant such actions at each stage of the
investigation.15 9 This strong presumption requirement should help deter the
government from taking actions against the company in response to public
outcry when, in actuality, seeking sanctions or convictions is strongly
against public policy.160 The two elements of an environmental excellence
program, taken together, should create an attractive incentive for high-
ranking officials to implement much needed compliance and monitoring
systems, while the public benefits overall from a cleaner environment.
Finally, new and much higher penalties should be enacted to allow the
government to seek additional punitive damages for businesses and CEOs it
prosecutes where it can be proven that the violation would not have
occurred if the company had been using a comprehensive audit program. 161
Although it may be difficult to prove, this penalty would give responsible
officers who currently want to cut costs by foregoing these audit programs
great incentive to enact them: the risk of losing an even greater amount of
money under a prosecution than its competitor (who is using an audit
program) would have to pay will help the CEO view cost cutting decisions
in a different light. Additionally, greater revenues would be generated that
could be contributed to the very expensive clean-up costs involved in
environmental disasters, or used to improve monitoring and enforcement of
the environmental laws. These changes would increase the rate of
voluntary self-evaluation and create greater protection for the environment.
15 8 James R. Moore & David Dabroski, EPA Environmental Auditing Policy and
Federal Criminal Enforcement, 1991 CRIM. ENFORCEMENT ENvTL. L. 207, 225
(emphasis deleted).
159 Id.
16 0 Unwarranted prosecutions sought in response to the public's reaction to the
violation is against public policy because it is a strong disincentive for companies to
expend the large amounts of money and time necessary to develop these high-
technology compliance programs. No CEO will implement such a costly system if the
risks of prosecution still remain high.
161 This type of penalty potentially raises constitutional problems because audit
programs are not currently mandated by law. A party subject to this new penalty
might raise Equal Protection or other constitutional arguments in its defense. This
issue would have to be considered and addressed if the new punitive damages were
enacted.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although many high-ranking business officers do not like the
responsible corporate officer doctrine and the lenient knowledge standards
in the environmental laws, these powerful prosecution tools force corporate
officers to be responsible or pay the price. The environment needs
protection, and imposing a high duty of care upon the people who have the
power to make the necessary changes is an effective and much-needed
deterrent. Correspondingly, audit programs should be implemented to meet
this high duty of care so the public will benefit overall. Although these
programs entail a lot of work and a substantial cost, these programs focus
on compliance and prevention which will save a corporation money in the
long run. By preventing huge disasters and remedying problems
immediately with programs developed to better assist situations needing a
quick response, the company saves large amounts of money that it would
have had to expend for clean up, and it avoids the negative publicity that
now inevitably follows an environmental disaster. To be fair, though, the
government needs to make certain changes on its part to give executives
incentives to devise these programs and reward them for doing so when
done in good faith.
The government must always remember that compliance is the goal,
not a successful criminal prosecution, because compliance is the best and
most effective way to keep the environment clean and the public safe. In
order to reach this goal, the government must give guarantees, not
guidelines, that criminal prosecution will be avoided if comprehensive
compliance programs are instituted. The government must be more willing
to recognize and reward these industries and high-ranking officials for their
compliance efforts so that more industry officials will take the initiative to
do an audit and make compliance a corporate goal. Lastly, additional
penalties should be imposed by the government where it can be proven that
an environmental violation would not have occurred if an audit program
had been in place.
These combined steps will serve to provide enhanced (or sufficient)
incentives and rewards for self-initiated corporate auditing programs, and
will promote the ultimate goal of a clean environment while keeping
corporate officers out of jail.
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